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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
HAROLD E. BEST and EARL CRAIG, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
BIG JIM MINING COMPANY, 
A Nevada Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8438 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 5th day of June, 195 3, Harold E. Best, a resident 
of Grand Junction, Colorado, obtained a mineral lease from 
the State of Utah. This lease was Mineral Lease No. 5418, and 
involved the standard form development and royalty coven~nts. 
Because Mr. Best is a man of limited capital he necessarily 
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He borrowed this money from Earl Craig, who, during 
the trial, was joined as a party plaintiff at the insistence of the 
defendant. 
Plaintiffs then began to investigate the possibility of de-
veloping the school section and determined that necessary finan-
cial support could not be obtained in Grand Junction. (R. 118) 
Because of this fact plaintiffs let it be known that they were 
open to offers from outside interests. Best was contacted by a 
group of California residents who subsequently formed the 
Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada corporation (R. 61, R. 63). 
Negotiations for the development of the school section were 
entered into, which negotiations ultimately resulted in the 
assignment of the school section to the Big Jim Mining Cor-
poration (R. 63) ; Exhibit ttB", which, hereinafter will be 
referred to as the agreement. 
The agreement provides: 
((Assignee promises to commence operations, weather 
conditions permitting, as soon as reasonable." 
The original lease provides as follows in the Sixth pro-
vision of Article III: 
((To commence actual operations upon the land in-
cluded herein on or before December 31, 1953 and 
thereafter to diligent! y operate the property in accord-
ance with the provisions contained in this lease . . ." 
The consideration for the assignment from Best to the 
Big Jim Mining Company is set forth in paragraphs 4 and 5 
of the agreement, as follows: 
((The assignee will pay to the assignor 16Y2% of the 
gross mill receipts after first deducting from the gross 
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mill receipts 12:Y2% of said mill receipts, which said 
12:Y2% is paid to the State of Uath as part of the rent 
for said leasehold. The assignee will further pay to the 
assignor 16V2% of all bonuses after the first deducting 
12Y2% of said bonusus which said 12Y2% must be paid 
to the State of Utah as further rental for said lease-
hold. 
((Assignee promises to have a licensed surveyor sur-
vey the aforementioned leasehold immediately. If the 
eastern boundary of said leasehold either intersects or 
is on the line where present mine wall of deepest pene-
tration westerly ends, the assignee will pay to the as-
signor the sum of $5500.00 if the survey shov1s that the 
eastern line is wester! y of the present mine wall of 
deepest westerly penetration then the assignee has the 
right to wait until it has received the Atomic Energy 
Commission drill report of uranium and vanadium of 
said leasehold and only if the report is satisfactory must 
the assignee pay the assignor $5500.00." 
The defendant drew the agreement, (R. 10, R. 121) and 
the agreement further provided for the defendant, as follows: 
((The assignee at all times has the right to abandon 
said mine and retain all the equipment thereon except 
as forbidden by the said laws of Utah. In the event of 
the abandonment of said mine, assignee must reassign 
said lease to assignor.'' 
The lease contained a forfeiture clause for non-production 
and failure to comply with the terms thereof. 
The defendant had a survey made of the property to de-
termine the eastern boundary (R. 94). It was determined that 
the boundary did not fall so as to entitle Best to the con-
tracted $5,500.00. 
In the fall of the year of the contract, the Atomic Energy 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Commission's drill reports were received by defendant (R. 95). 
Plaintiffs attempted to find the contents of these reports but 
were refused access to them by defendant (R. 18). Plaintiffs 
then demanded the $5,500.00 (R. 21, R. 78) and were in-
formed by Big Jim that the Atomic Energy Commission reports 
were unsatisfactory, (R. 95) and that the mining and produc-
tion of the property was impossible (R. 71, R. 74, R. 75). 
Herman Stern, of the Big Jim Mining Company, testified at the 
trial that the defendant was under no obligation to mine the 
property ( R. 12 7) . After the obvious refusal of the defendant 
to mine or develop the property and pay the $5,500.00, de-
mand was maae for the return of the property (R. 22), Ex-
hibits tcC" and tcJ". Big Jim Mining Company, by letter of 
April 30, 1954, stated that a reconveyance of the property 
would be forthcoming, Exhibit HK". The Big Jim Mining Com-
pany did not reconvey, however, notwithstanding the demands 
and their own promises. Best then commenced the instant action 
for the return of his property. 
The plaintiff Best in the prosecution of this law suit 
utilized every possible means of discovery. This can be seen 
- -
from the file and record herein. The defendant Big Jim Mining 
Company at no time utilized any discovery technique what-
soever. 
At the pre-trial the issues for trial were stated by the Court 
as follows: 
nAil right. So for the pre-trial we will put this ques-
tion of law. Was this contract an enforceable contract? 
That is, the first one. Then a mixed question of law and 
fact. Has there been an abandonment of this contract, 
Exhibit B. Another question of law and fact. Has there 
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been a forfeiture of the defendant's right to claim under 
the assignment made pursuant to this agreement? Then 
another question. If there has been either an abandon-
ment or forfeiture, what damage has the plaintiff sus-
tained and how much ? Those are the issues in this 
case. Now ordinarily I would go into more detail about 
the thing but as I view it, there isn't going to be any 
serious controversy over what the facts are. That's 
correct, isn't it?" (P-T R. 40). 
Subsequent to this defendant's counsel questioned the 
issue of forfeiture and discussion followed. The Court then re-
stated the issues as follows ( P-T R. 44) : 
A. n ... I will restate the issues. Is there such a lack of 
mutuality in the contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit nB," that the 
plaintiff is entitled to a reassignment of the lease to 
the school section described in the complaint? 
((Has there been an abandonment of the contract, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit n B," on the part of the defendant? 
((Has the defendant breached the contract, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit c c B,'' and if there has been such a breach is the 
plaintiff entitled to have the school section reassigned?" 
nis the plaintiff entitled to damages, and if so, in what 
amount?" 
After the issues were again considered counsel for de-
fendant requested an additional issue be added which was 
stated by the Court as follows (P-T R. 45): 
cc ••• Has there been a waiver of the abandonment 
if any has occurred and a waiver of the breach if any 
has occurred . . . '' 
At the trial the evidence was presented in .. regard to the 
issues. Defendant Big Jim Mining Company at that time at-
tempted to raise an issue as to real party in interest. At the 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
instance of defendant, plaintiff moved to join Earl Craig as 
a party plaintiff (R. 42). The Court did not allow defendant to 
pursue questions pertaining to conceivable interests and deal-
ings of the plaintiffs, but the Court did give the defendants the 
right to pursue such questions of any person by deposition or 
any discovery technique subsequent to the trial (R. 45). De-
fendant, apparently realizing that any such interests were non-
existent, did not avail itself of the right given by the Court 
and did not in any manner attempt to utilize discovery tech-
nique in order to change the ruling of the Court, or get a new 
trial as the Court had given it the opportunity so to do. 
The Court completed the trial of the issues and found 
them in favor of Plaintiffs. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT BELOW, THE BIG JIM MINING COM-
PANY, ABANDONED THE MINING LEASE AND 
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN IT AND 
HAROLD E. BEST AND EARL CRAIG, PLAINTIFFS BE-
LOW. 
Abandonment is a legal doctrine encompassing two ele-
ments: An intent to abandon and a physical relinquishment. 
Whelan v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., 212 S.W. 2d 991 (Tex., Civ. App. 
1948). The intention may be shown by an express intention on 
the part of the lessee or assignee or by circumstantial evidence 
such as non-production of the property. Hoff v. Girdler Corp., 
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104 Colo. 56, 88 P. 2d 100; Spies v. DeMayo} 396 Ill. 255, 72 
N.E. 2d 316. 
In the instant case the defendant Big Jim Mining Com-
pany not only failed and refused to develop the school section 
in question thereby circumstantially fulfilling the requisite 
element of intention but the company also expressly asserted 
that a mining venture was out of the question and that the 
property would be reconveyed pursuant to the demands of 
plaintiffs. Demand for return of the property was made on 
numerous occasions because defendant consistently asserted 
that it had no intention to proceed and develop the property. 
Exhibit ttC", a demand letter from plaintiffs' California counsel, 
states in part as follows: 
A. (( ... In view of nonperformance with reference to 
commencement of operations relative to the properties 
under said lease, demand is herewith made upon you 
to reassign said lease to H. E. Best." 
In answer to this letter the defendant Big Jim Mining 
Company replied as follows in Exhibit ((K": 
nThis will confirm our telephone conversation of 
April 28th wherein I told you that the directors of Big 
Jim Mining Company will execute the assignment 
forthwith as demanded in your letter of April 26th. 
Kindly prepare the assignment you want executed." 
This exhibit was admitted through plaintiffs' Request For 
Admission to be a copy of a letter nbetween plaintiff and his 
agents on the one hand and defendant and its agents on the 
other" and was duly admitted into evidence at the trial. At the 
trial when questioned as to the intention of the defendant to 
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return the property, Jack Egar, the President of the defendant 
Big Jim Mining Co., answered and concluded as follows: 
((My answer is in the letter" (R. 84). 
The foregoing exchange of letters resulted after many prior 
demands and conversations in regard to the defendant's aban-
donment of the property. Plaintiff Best discussed the possi-
bility of re-adjusting royalty interests with Jack Egar, president 
of the defendant Big Jim Mining Co., in an effort to get some-
thing accomplished in reference to the development of the 
property (R. 20). Subsequent to this a demand letter was 
written to the defendant, Exhibit t(J", which letter was more 
than a month in time prior to Exhibit ((K" as discussed above. 
Defendant considered the AEC Drill Reports as shown by 
Exhibit uB". 
It is obvious from all of the foregoing and other evidence 
in the record that the defendant Big Jim Mining Co., concluded 
to abandon the contemplated mining enterprise and reassign 
the lease in question. The defendant, of course, at no time 
undertook the development of the property, thereby fulfilling 
the element of ((physical relinquishment" (R. 126). 
The foregoing together with other evidence is more than 
sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court. 
In addition to the express intention, however, the record 
throughout discloses the circumstantial evidence as to intention 
which again irrefutably establishes abandonment on the part 
of defendant. 
Defendant through Mr. Herman Stern testified that the 
AEC drill reports of the property were unsatisfactory. 
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Question: "And did you so advise Mr. Best in the 
opinion of the company the report of the AEC was 
unsatisfactory?" 
Answer: "I did." (R. 95). 
Defendant's answer to plaintiff's Interrogatory No. 1: 
((The AEC report was unsatisfactory because the map 
and drill logs showed that of the 43 holes drilled, only 
5 contained ore that was commercially marketable, and 
that these holes were far apart and in no definite 
trend of mineralization. In addition it fuas been de-
termined that the ore has a high limestone content." 
Defendant through Mr. Egar testified to the response 
received in regard to the property after various companies and 
engineers had examined the reports of the property. 
Answer: ((He said that he had many such reports 
come to him and never had it been his experience to 
have so many poor drill report holes on one property. 
He cannot understand why they drilled so many.'' 
(R. 74) 
Answer: ((yes, he notified me that after getting the 
report from his geologist they had no interest in this 
piece of property." (R. 75) 
Question: ((Did you see anybody who was favorably 
inclined toward this property?'' 
Answer: ((No. - - - " (R. 75). 
Defendant through Mr. Stern was questioned by the court 
as follows: 
The Court: ('Well, but you don't have any, under 
your theory you don't have an obligation other than 
to investigate, you don't have any obligation to mine, 
is that right?'' 
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Answer: ((We only have the obligation to mine if 
it proves profitable. In other words, if there is no ore 
there or would be so expensive to take out then we 
don't have this obligation ... " (R. 127) 
The record is replete with evidence such as this which 
without any question circumstantially establishes intention to 
abandon as found by the Trial Court. 
In Smith v. Moody} 192 Ark. 704, 94 S.W. 2d 357, plain-
tiff sought to cancel a portion of a lease alleging that defendant 
had abandoned and failed to attempt development work con-
tending that the property could not be drilled except at great 
loss. The court ruled in favor of the lessor and observed on 
page 358 of the Southwest Reporter, stating that if the lessee's 
contention were true, ((the lessees have not been damaged by the 
cancellation of so much of the contract of lease as cannot be 
profitably performed." See also Sander v. Mid-Continent Pe-
troleum Corp.J 292 U.S. 272, 54 Sup. Ct. 671, 78 L. Ed, 1255; 
Romero v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.J 93 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. 
Pa. 1950); Harris v. Morris Plow Co.J 144 Kan. 501, 61 P. 2d 
901. 
It has also been held in gas cases that an inability to 
market should not permit a lessee to hold and freeze the lessor's 
land indefinitely. Benedum-Trees Oil Co. v. Davis} 107 F. 2d 
981 (C.C.A. 6, 1939); Hodges v. Mud Branch Oil & Gas Co., 
270 Ky. 206, 109 S.W. 2d 576; Severson v. Ba,-stowJ 103 Mont. 
526, 63 P. 2d 1022. 
The only defense presented by defendant in regard to 
abandonment of the lease and property was to the effect that 
defendant was attempting to sell the property to others-in 
10 
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other words, defendant had no intention of developing the 
property but rather directed its efforts toward speculation. 
Rice v. Lee, 44 Cal. App. 2d 909, 113 P. 2d 235, involved 
an action to quiet title by the lessor of an oil and gas lease. 
The lessee did not commence to drill or develop the propert~ 
and the Court found that the lessee did not intend to drill and 
develop the property and also that the lessee intended to hold 
the property for speculative purposes. On pages -236 and 23 7 
of the Pacific Reporter the Court asserted the following: 
(( . . . that rights granted under such leases are for 
exploration and development and the courts will not 
permit the leassee to fail in development and hold the 
lease for speculative or other purposes . . . " 
t t • • • evidence and reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom are ample to support the conclusion 
of the trial court that the lessees did not intend to 
explore, drill and develop the demised premises, and 
that such failure constituted an abandonment.'' 
See also: Carlisle v. Lady, 109 Cal. App. 567, 293 Pac. 686; 
Caswell v. Gardner, 12 Cal. App. 2d 597, 601, 55 P. 2d 1222; 
Garrison v. Hogan, 112 Cal. App. 525, 297 Pac. 87. 
Bradley v. Fackler, (Wash.) 126 P. 2d 190, sets forth 
the following policy after holding abandonment existed: 
ttlt would be unjust and unreasonable, and contra-
vene the nature and spirit of the lease to allow the 
lessee to continue to hold his term a considerable length 
of time, without making any effort at all to mine for 
gold or other metals. Such a construction of the rights 
of the parties, would enable him to prevent the lessor 
from getting his tolls under the express covenants to 
pay the same, and deprive him of all oportunity to work 
11 
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the mine himself, or permit others to do so. The law 
does not tolerate such practical absurdity, nor will it 
permit the possibility of such in justice.'' 
Justice Wade dissenting in Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co., 
(Utah), 185 P. 2d 747, a case which will be discussed and dis-
tinguished hereinafter, quotes from Harris v. Riggs, 63 Ind. 
App. 201, 112 N.E. 36, 39: 
CCThe rights granted under such leases are for ex-
ploration and development. The title of interest granted 
is inchoate until oil or gas is found in quantity, war-
ranting operation, and courts will not permit the lessee 
to fail in development and hold the lease for specu-
lative or other purposes, except in strict compliance 
with his contract for a valuable and sufficient consider-
ation other than such development." 
In Brown v. Wilmore Coal Co., 82 C.C.A. 295: 153 Fed. 
143, the court concluded as the trial court found in the instant 
action, that a mining enterprise was contemplated. On Page 
145 the court observes the following: 
ccMr. Brown didn't expect to do any mining person-
ally and he has· not, either by himself or others; his 
purpose being to sell leases to others or transfer them 
to some company which would operate them." 
The court analyzed the intention in abandonment care-
fully and concluded that its essence was not a broad intention 
to abandon or retain mineral rights alone, divorced from the 
obligations which adhere to it under the contract, but the 
intention to abandon the contemplated enterprise. 
See also Paine v. Griffith, 86 Fed. 45 5, 30 CCA 182; Elk 
Fork v. Jen-nings, 84 Fed. 839. 
12 
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A mining enterprise was without question contemplated 
by the plaintiff and defendant. The assignment called for 
royalty interest and development. The defendant allegedly 
was capitalized to mine the property (R. 13) . At the trial 
defendant through Herman Stern stated that only a qualified 
obligation to mine existed (R. 127). But even more telling than 
this, defendant through Jack Egar testified that the company 
considered the engineering report of the property and con-
cluded that rather than develop tbe property to interest other 
people in it (R. 70). 
The foregoing not only adds to the circumstantial evidence 
for abandonme~nt but in and of itself is an express manifesta-
tion that the contemplated enterprise was abandoned. The 
Court properly found that the enterprise contemplated by the 
parties was the development and mining of the school section 
and that ((the defendant in this action did abandon the said 
contemplated enterprise" (Findings 6 and 8). 
The position taken by defendant and appellant not only 
ts against the weight of authority but is unreasonable and 
unjust .To sustain defendant's theory would amount to legal-
ized larceny. An assignment of the lease was obtained for no 
consideration whatsoever save an amount to , be paid upon 
favorable drill reports plus the prime consideration of royalty 
interest. Defendant then blandly asserts that it could not pos-
sibly mine the property and in fact that the property cannot 
be profitably mined; that it will not in fact mine or develop the 
property., Of course, contends the defendant, the foregoing 
does not amount to abandonment because we J.Tlay be able to 
sell the property. If this is true the next successor in interest 
13 
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could also take the same position and so on ad infinitum. The 
resuit is obvious. The original lesso~ ends up giving away his 
property, ~nd· received absolutely nothing. The entire chain 
is contrary to the provisions of the lease, the evidence anA sound 
reason. Such a position cannot be sustained. 
Appellant alleged! y cites authority for its position, but an 
examination of these cases indicates their distinguishing fea-
tures. 
Berry v. Kelly Co.J 90 Cal. App. 2d 486, 203 P. 2d 80, in-
volved an oil lease. The defendant took possession of certain 
property. A derrick was in place when possession was taken 
and a 3,000 foot depth had been drilled. Portions of the acreage 
were covered by sumps, a ramp, and oil saturated dirt. Me-
chanical failures caused defendant to have the machinery and 
derricks moved. Also the defendant had been involved in liti-
gation which had been concluded only a few days prior to com-
mencement of the action by the lessor and before this action 
was concluded the lessee had not been able to give the go ahead 
to an oil company with which he had contracted tore-drill the 
well and place it on production within 45 to 70 days. The court 
also made spe~ial note of the fact that the lessor had ~?-ever 
given the lessee notice that he may have defaulted or that any 
action may be taken. The court' found that there was no ev~~ence 
of an intent to abandon. 
The facts of the instant case certainly in no way resemble 
those last cited. 
Baldwin v. Jacobs, 182 Ia. 719, 166 N.W. 271, is a farm 
lease case in which the court pointed out that the defendant's 
14 
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moving to other premises would not in and of itself amount 
to abandonment. The defendant affirmatively clai~ed the use 
of the premises and the sale of growing crops by defendant 
was considered to be usual farming practice. Had the defendant 
notified the plaintiff that the farm was worthless, that the soil 
was not conducive to growth, that farming on the land could 
not be profitable, and that he was going to reassign the lease 
to plaintiff, the decision of the court may well have differed. 
Becker v. Rute, 228 Ia. 533, 293 N.W. 18, is a landlord-
tenant case wherein the tenant surrendered the premises to the 
landlord after receiving notice of forfeiture. The tenant then 
brought action for the rent which the landlord subsequently 
received, claiming abandonment thereby entitling the tenant to 
a mitigation of damages. The court held that the duty of the 
landlord to minimize damage pertained only to abandonment 
and not to a surrender under a forfeiture notice. 
It would appear that this case is interesting but meaning-
less insofar as the instant action is concerned. The case ob-
viously involves a legal incident of abandonment, that being 
the duty to mitigate damage. This duty under Iowa law is not 
present in forfeiture through contract provision. Nothing can 
be gained here by an academic discussion with the appellant 
~:. 
as to jhe legal incidents of abandonment and forfeiture. The 
case is obviously not in point. 
Crane v. French, 39 Cal. App. 2d 642, 104 P. 2d 53, in-
volved a situation where the only evidence presented by the 
plaintiff to establish abandonment was the fact that defendant 
was not on th~, premises. This is not comparable to the instant 
case and distinguishable on that basis. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Fischer v. Petroleum Co., 156 Kan. 367, 133 P. 2d 95, was 
a policy decision rendered by the California Court. The lessee 
had failed to continue to develop certain oil properties. Lessee 
after demand refused to further deyelop because of flooded 
market conditions but stated that drilling would proceed as 
market conditions improved. On Page 97 of the Pacific Re-
porter the court comments as follows: 
((During the past few years, there has existed in 
the oil industry a condition wherein the potential pro-
duction is greatly in excess of market demand; ***states 
and the United States government have adopted meas-
ures to control and restrict production of petroleum 
to meet the market demand.'' 
A Kansas statute permitted only fractional production of 
operating wells. In comm_enting on the apparent lack of har-
mony of Kansas decisions on development, the court said: 
((Some of the differences perhaps may be accounted 
for by the fact that through comparatively recent years 
there has been generally a shifting of emphasis from 
production to conservation of our natural resources. 
This trend, evidenced by conservation and pro-ration 
statutes and in other ways is so well recognized as to 
require no comment. Courts naturally reflect this trend 
by stressing the mutual interests of both the lessor and 
lessee rather than the special interest of the lessor only 
in securing production.'' 
The Court held that abandonment had not occurred. It is well 
to note, however, the lang~age of the court on page 101: 
((Of course if the lessee has clearly indicated by word 
or conduct that he regards the tract not worth develop-
ing at any time, it may well be held that he has aban-
doned the lease and such abandonment calls for for-
feiture and removal of the encumbrances.'' 
16 
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Also note Myers v. Shell Petroleum Co., 153 Kan. at P. 296, 110 
P. 2d at p. 826: 
((Manifestly if the lessee thinks an undeveloped por-
tion of his lease cannot be developed with profit to 
him he rna y be required to surrender such portion of 
the lease." 
The appellant .~ertainly cannot contend that the market 
conditions for uranium are presently comparable to those of 
I 
oil in the Fischer case. The Federal Government itself is pres-
ently guaranteeing a market and price. The cry for uranium 
for the defense of this co~ntry needs no ~laboration. 
In conclusion it must be readily seen that ample evidence 
is present to sustain the trial court decision of abandonment. 
The appellant has presented neither evidence nor law to sup-
port its position and the trial court decision should be sustained. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DE-
FENDANT FORFEITED ITs-·RIGHTS UNDER THE AS-
SIGNMENT OF THE UTAH STATE LEASE FOR URA-
NIUM AND VANADIUM. 
In addition to the Trial Court's finding that defendant 
abandoned the lease and the contemplated enterprise, find-
ings were likewise entered by the Trial Court concerning a for-
feiture, as follows: 
((6. The enterprise contemplated by the parties was 
the development and mining of said Section 16 for 
commercial ore bodies with reasonable diligence and 
17 
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continuity, and when the parties in paragraphs 6, 7 and 
8 of their agreement, said Exhibit HB", referred to 
((mine", the reference was to the said contemplated 
enterprise and not only to the tunn~l ~ereinbefore re· 
£erred to in paragraph 3 of these Ftndtngs. 
* * * 
~ ~ 10. The main and basic considerations for plain· 
tiffs entering into the said assignment, Exhibit ((B", 
was to have reasonably prompt development and dili-
gent operation of the property to effect recovery of 
royalties due plaintiffs under the assignment, and to 
receive the payment of $5500.00 under the terms of 
Exhibit HB." 
t( 11. Subsequent to the receipt by the defendant of 
the AEC report contemplated by said Exhibit HB", 
plaintiffs made demands for the payment of $5,500.00 
and on April 26, 1954, plaintiffs demanded a reas· 
signment of the lease on said School Section 16 because 
of the non-performance of the obligations to be per-
formed by the defendant as provided in said Exhibit 
ttB". 
cc12. The defendant failed to pay $5,500.00 under 
the Agreement and takes the position that said Section 
16 contains no commercial ore deposits and further 
contends there is no obligation under the Agreement 
to mine or develop and the only obligation is to pay 
rentals to the State of Utah in order to keep the Lease 
in good standing; and defendant has failed and re· 
fused to prosecute any mining operation or develop-
ment on the property sufficient to meet its duties under 
the contemplated enterprise, Exhibit ~~B", and the Lease 
from the State of Utah. 
t ·That under the terms of the Lease from the State 
of Utah and the said Exhibit t'B", defendant is bound 
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From the foregoing facts the Court concluded that the 
defendant had committed a forfeiture of its rights under the 
said assignment of School Section 16. 
That either the theory of abandonment, discussed in 
Point I of this Brief, or the theory of forfeiture, to be discussed 
herein, supports the Trial Court's judgment is illustrated by 
the case of Bradley v. Fackler, supra, in which the court dis-
tinguished between abandonment (intention of the lessee and 
if the enterprise is abandoned the courts will afford relief by 
cancellation of the least or other appropri~te remedy) and for-
feiture (,which results from action of the lessor in declaring the 
lease forfeited by reason of the failure of the lessee to perform 
express or implied ·covenants contained in the lease) and the 
court said: 
((Thus, a lessee's failure to continue mining opera-
tions on the leased premises may constitute both an 
abandonment of the lease and a violation of a covenant 
obligating him to prosecute the rnining enterprise with 
reasonable diligence." 
See also 60 A.L.R. 926, wherein the editor states as follows: 
CCA mining lease may be avoided not only on the 
ground of forfeiture by the lessee, but also on the 
ground of abandonment. In this regard there is a dis-
tinction between failure and neglect of the lessee to 
develop the leased premises, or to operate the mines 
or wells discovered, and the abandonment by him of 
the enterprise, although in many instances the distinc-
tion is perhaps obscure. An important distinction is 
that abandonmen is a question of intention; hence the 
act of the lessee may indicate his intention to abandon 
the enterprise he has undertaken under the lease, when 
it would not be sufficient to show neglect or failure 
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to develop or produce sufficient mineral as to entitle 
the lessor to a forfeiture of the lease. The cases hold 
that abandonment is a question of fact, and where 
established affords ground for relief to the lessor by 
a cancellation of the lease or other relief.'' 
The annotation from which the foregoing quotation was 
taken begins with the case of ·Freeport Sulphur Company v. 
American Sulphur Royalty Company of Texas, 6 S.W. 2d 1039. 
At 60A.L.R. 890 and continuing through and including page 
9 36, is an excellent annotation concerning the ((Duty of lessee 
or purchaser or mineral rights other than oil or gas as to de-
velopment and operation." The entire annotation is directly 
in point with respect to the subject matter of this inquiry and 
we strongly invite the Court's attention to the rules and cases 
therein set forth. Further reference to the annotated portion 
beginning at 60 A.L.R. 901 will be found in subsequent portions 
of this argument. 
Based on the foregoing law, if the evidence in this case 
supports an abandonment or forfeiture, or both, the judgment 
of the lower court must be affirmed. 
Defendant and appellant contends under Point II of its 
Brief that the contractura~ arrangements between the parties 
cannot be interpreted as establishing defendant's duty to operate 
the property with reasonable diligence. Defendant ignores or 
overlooks express and implied conditions establishing such 
a duty. 
The allegations in paragraphs 2 through 5 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint as as follows: 
((2. On or about the 5th day of June, 1953, the plain-
tiff was granted a uranium and vanadium mineral lease 
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by the Utah State Land Board covering all of Section 
16, Township 36 South, Range 25 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian; said land being a school section situate in 
San Juan County, State of Utah; said Utah State Land 
Board lease being identified as mineral lease No. 5418 
on the records of the Utah State Land Board. A copy of 
said lease is attached hereto as Exhibit nA". 
~~3. On or about the 17th day of July, 1953, the 
plaintiff assigned said lease No. 5418 to one Herman 
Stern as attorney for the Big Jim Mining Company, 
the defendant herein. A copy of said assignment is 
attached as Exhibit nB", that on or about the 18th day 
of August, 195 3, the plaintiff at the request of the said 
Herman Stern acting for the Big Jim Mining Company, 
and to further effectuate said agreement and assign-
ment of July 17, 1953, as aforesaid, executed a Utah 
State Land Office form assignment, assigning said Utah 
State Land lease to the Big Jim Mining Company. 
n4. That on or about the 12th day of November, 
1953, the Big Jim Mining Company accepted said as-
signment and agreed to perform all covenants and ob-
ligations. 
((5. That by the terms of said Utah State Land Board 
lease No. 5418 actual operations on the leased land 
were to commence on or before December 31, 1953, and 
said leasee covenanted to diligent! y operate said prop-
erty in accordance with said lease.'' 
Defendant's Answer admits all of these allegations in 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Hence, in construing the agreement between the parties, 
it is necessary to consider not only the terms of the assignment 
itself, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit nB", but 
also the terms of the Utah State Lease for Uranium and Vana-
dium, which is attached to the complaint as Exhibit nA", must 
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also be considered as an integral part of the agreement. In 
the case of Colorado Fuel and Iron Company v. Pryor, 25 
Colo. 540, 57 Pac. 51, 60 A.L.R. 935, the court said: 
nln construing a contract, the first point to ascertain 
is what the parties meant, understood, and intended as 
determined by the words employed; ... and, as an aid 
in this respect, the situation of the parties, and the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction at 
the time of the execution of the contract, as also its 
subject matter, and the object of the parties in making 
it, may be taken into consideration ... " 
The necessity of construing these documents together is 
substantiated by Article VII of the Utah State Lease which 
provides, as follows: 
Hit is mutually understood and agreed by the parties 
hereto that all of the terms, covenants, conditions, and 
obligations in this lease contained, shall be binding 
upon the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns 
of the lessee." 
The Utah State Lease is granted in consideration of the 
rents and royalties to be paid to the State Land Board and 
provides as an obligation of the lessee in Article III, Section 
6, the following: 
HTo commence actual operations upon the land in-
cluded herein on or before Dec. 31, 195 3, and there-
after to diligently operate the property in accordance 
with the provisions contained in this lease. Failure to 
so continue the operation of the land included herein 
for a period of more than six ( 6) months without prior 
written approval of the State Land Board shall be cause 
for forfeiture, and that upon the violation of this pro-
vision or any of the other terms of this lease the Lessor 
may at its option after thirty ( 30) days notice by reg-
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istered mail cancel this lease. After the expiration of 
the said thirty ( 30) days and the cancellation of the 
lease no notice of such cancellation need be given the 
Lessee.'' 
According to the express provisions of the Utah State 
Lease the defendant is obligated to commence actual opera-
tions on the land and to ~evelop the property diligently, and 
it is stated that failure in this duty will result in a forfeiture. 
And yet, defendant poses the brash question: nBut where are 
the provisions that were supposedly breached with regard to 
operation of the property?'' 
Turning now to a brief analysis of the assignment of the 
Utah State Lease from plaintiff Harold Best to the defendant, 
which is set forth in paragraph 2 of the Lower Court's Finding 
of Fact with the paragraphs of the said Assignment being 
numbered by the Court for convenience. The agreement refers 
to the Utah State Lease and property involved, and in para-
graph 4 defendant agrees to pay to plaintiff a substantial over-
riding royalty. As a further covenant, in paragraph 5 of the 
Assignment it is agreed that defendant will pay plaintiff an 
addtiional $5,500.00 only if a contemplated report from the 
AEC is satisfactory. There is no conflict in the facts which re-
vealed that the AEC report was unsatisfactory and that the 
$5,500.00 was never paid. 
In paragraph 6 of the Assignment, as numbered by the 
Lower Court, the parties recognized the possibility of abandon-
ment, or paranthetically, a forfeiture, and it is stipulated that 
upon the happening of the event, the defendant must reassign 
the lease to plaintiff. 
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It is then provided in paragraph 9 of the Assignment as 
follows: 
f(Assignee (defendant) promises to commence opera-
tionsJ weather conditions permiting, as soon as rea-
sonable." (Italics added) 
Defendant contends that its duties were fulfilled by the 
efforts of defendant in finding persons to invest in the property 
after it had determined by survey and geological reports that 
the property was completely unsatisfactory for a mining opera-
tion. It is difficult to understand how the ((operations" con-
tended by defendant as the sole extent of its duty, i.e., to find 
another buyer for the property, could be delayed by weather 
conditions. It is clear that the parties were contemplating the 
same actual operations on the property required by the Utah 
State Lease to begin on or before December 31, 1953, and in 
view of the fact that the Assignment was executed in mid-
summer, i.e., July 17, 1953, it would reasonably be expected 
that adverse weather conditions would not offer any substantial 
delay. 
In utter desperation to show some effort or expenditure, 
defendant even contends that its capitalization and formation 
into a corporation was a discharge of its duty to operate the 
property diligently. 
In truth and fact the record reveals no attempt whatsoever 
by defendant to operate the School Section in any manner. On 
pages 126 and 127 of the Transcript, Mr. Herman Stern, 
Vice-President and Treasurer of the Defendant (R. 88), re-
sponded to the court's inquiry as follows: 
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THE COURT: ccMay I ask a question there? This is 
true, isn't it, that you had a survey made?" 
A. (CCorrect." 
THE COURT: ccPaid for the survey?" 
A tty '' . es. 
THE COURT: ccYou have had the property ex-
amined-" 
A tty " . es. 
THE COURT: (continuing) by geologists and en-
gineers?'' 
A tty " . es. 
THE COURT: ((You have paid the rent for 1954 
and 1955?" 
A ny '' . es. 
THE COURT: ((What else have you done?" 
A. ((That's all the work we have done for 1954. 
Fifty-five we have other plans going. In other words, 
I have heard since November that there is another 
working to be put in very close to the property so we 
are going to send out engineers to get a new report 
what's going on to see what we can do on this thing 
so we can go from there.'' 
THE COURT: ((You don't admit that you have any 
obligation to do any of those things, do you?" 
A. ((We have an obligation to keep the property up, 
yes, to do all the work that is required." 
THE COURT: ((Well, but you don't have any, under 
theory, you don't have any obligation other than to 
investigate, you don't have any obligation to mine, 
is that right?" 
A. ttW e only have the obligation to mine if it proves 
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profitable. In other words, if there is no o~e _there ~r 
would be so expensive to take then v:e don t have thiS 
obligation. We have to first determtne to get at the 
ore to remove it and how rich it is. In other words, sup-
posing there is no more ore on this property. Then we 
may not have any obligation to mine." 
THE COURT: ((But you've got to make entries and 
tunnels, don't you?" 
A. ((Well, you have to drill the property. You drill." 
THE COURT: ((You drill it?" 
A. CtFirst, yes. To determine where your tunnels are 
if you're going to build tunnels or sink shafts. You have 
to drill it first ?'' 
Defendant's own testimony recognizes the necessity of 
drilling the property as an initial step in deter~g whether 
ore bodies exist but no such drilling operation w~s underta~en. 
The survey referted to was completed only to determine the 
boundaries of the property (R. 94), and the alleged geo-
logical reports, obtained by defendant in 1954 were without 
cost, from other concerns which were investigating this prop-
erty (R. 127, 128). 
The ill-conceived attempts to discover some third person 
to whom the defendant could assign its interest is an affirmative 
factor showing the complete lack of any efforts ttto commence 
actual operations on the land" and ttto diligently operate the 
property." In this regards, Lindley on Mines, Section 644, 
states that while the general rule places the burden of proof 
upon him alleging an abandonment or forfeiture, an· excep-
tion is noted as follows: 
H • • • where a party shows that no work was per· 
formed by his adversary within the limits of a claim 
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he makes out a prima facie case and thereafter, should 
such adversary depend upon labor done outside the 
claim, the burden is cast upon him of proving the per-
formance of such a labor and proving that its reason-
able tendency is to benefit the claim." 
Certainly plaintiffs have established by competent evidence 
the complete failure of defendant to fulfill its duties with re-
spect to this mining venture. As stated in the case of Brown 
v. Wilmore Coal Co., supra, as follows: 
tCMr. Brown didn't expect to do any mtntng per-
sonally and he has not, either by himself or others; 
his purpose being to sell the leases to others or transfer 
them to some company which would operate them." 
-;~ 
Such an intention as indicated by the Brown case will 
not fulfill obligations under a mining lease. 
Unquestionably the Utah State Lease was in the immediate 
contemplation of the parties when the Assignment was ex-
ecuted, and the parties must have contracted with respect to 
the urgent need demanded by the Utah State Lease to commence 
operations by December 31, 1953, in order to avoid a possible 
forfeiture of rights to the State Land Board. The date of De-
cember 31, 1953, demanded by the State Land Board, by which 
time actual operations must commence, and the immediate 
danger of escheat of the mineral lease, prompted plaintiff 
through his attorney to write the letter dated April 26, 1954 
(attached to plaintiff's' re<J_uest for admission as Exhibit ~~C" 
and admitted in evidence by stipulation), demanding a return 
of the property for tenon-performance with reference to com-
mencement of operations relative to properties under said 
lease . . . " The parties in their agreement contemplated im-
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mediate operation of the properties, a duty which defendant 
completely ignored in its abortive attempts to interest other 
individuals in the mining venture. 
That a court should not torture language to establish a 
new contractural relationship not contemplated by the parties 
is a proposition which we readily accept and accordingly en-
dorse the principle as set forth in many of the cases cited by 
appellant. Several of these cases, standing for such a proposi-
tion, will be distinguished in succeeding paragraphs of this 
brief. 
In the case of Howorth v. Mills, 62 Utah 574, 221 Pac. 
16 5, an action was commenced to recover an installment of 
purchase price past due on a contract for the sale of real prop-
erty on which the defendant had paid $8,833.00 on a $16,500.00 
purchase price. After judgment for plaintiff for past due in-
stallments and on appeal the defendant contended that the 
seller's remedy was limited to a forfeiture. This court simply 
held that under the particular contract, the seller could either 
declare a forfeiture or follow the chosen remedy of suing for 
specific performance, and the judgment was affirmed. The 
language quoted from the case in appellant's brief on page 27 
is taken out of context and under the facts of the Howorth 
case has absolutely no bearing on the present controversy. 
In the case of Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Company, 68 Kan. 
176, 74 Pac. 625, the lessee agreed Hto drill a well upoa. said 
premises within one year from this date or thereafter pay (to 
lessor) Forty Dollars annually until said well is drilled ... " 
The plaintiffs contended in attempting to invoke a for-
feiture that it had been represented to them that the defendant 
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would furnish gas for the domestic use of the family, and as 
a result the defendant was obligated to drill a well. The court 
applied the parol evidence rule and held that the expressed 
stipulations in the agreement control oral stipulations directly 
contrary to the expressed terms in writing. Oil and gas leases 
of this type allowing the lessee the option to drill or to pay 
a stipulated rental are widely used in this particular field and 
are to be carefully distinguished from a situation where no 
alternative course of action is open. In the Rose case, a duty to 
develop the leased premises does an in justice to the expressed 
terms of the lease. Such a conclusion is completely unwarranted 
in the present case. 
In the case of Johnson v. Geddes, 49 Utah 137, 161 Pac. 
910, cited by appellant on page 26 of its brief as ((instructive 
and important," the plaintiff commenced an action to recover 
the sum of $9,000.00 from defendant as a balance due on 
the purchase price for mining claims. Judgment for plaintiff 
was reversed on appeal. The majority opinion devoted itself 
almost entirely to an analysis of the agreement between the 
parties by the terms of which defendants were given an option 
to pay as the full purchase price of the claims either ( 1) 
$16,000.00 unconditionally or (2) $21,00.00, $12,000.00 un-
conditionally and the balance of $9,000.00 to be paid out of 
the proceeds of the mine. The defendant elected to purchase 
the mining claims for the $21,000.00 amount, paid the $12,-
000':UO, received a warranty deed on the claims, and thereafter 
completed no work and refused to pay the $9,000.00 for which 
plaintiff brought the action. The court held that the contract 
was clear and explicit, applied the parole evidence rule, and 
analyzed the contract as follows: 
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'tIn the first option agreement it is made as plain 
as the English language can make it that the $9,000.00 
'shall be paid only' out of the 'net one-half of the pro-
ceeds of all ores mined from said property.' Then fol-
lows the provision that the defendants' shall determine 
'extent and manner of the development work.' In an-
other part of the option agreement it was again pro-
vided that the $9,000.00 shall be paid 'in the manner 
and only in the manner provided for . . . ' ". 
The court reasoned that under the clear and expressed 
terms of the contract defendants had no duty to operate the 
properties in order to obtain proceeds from which plaintiff 
would receive the remaining $9,000.00, and the court indicated 
it was powerless to impose such a duty in face of the expressed 
language in the agreement. 
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Straup admits that 
the court cannot make a new contract for the parties, but he 
allows that the language should be interpreted with reference 
to the surrounding . circumstances and the subject matter in-
volved, and he concludes, as follows: 
"To say one had agreed to pay $9,000.00 out of pro-
ceeds of ore mined by him from the property, and then 
say he was at no time required to work or mine it or 
do anything to obtain ore, seems to me but contrary 
propositions. I thus think the defendants had a duty 
to perform and were required to make reasonable ef-
forts to meet the payment out of net proceeds of ore, 
and that they were entitled to a reasonable time to do 
that.'' 
"To uphold the defendants in their contention would 
mean that they have the sole right to say when such 
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Involved in the Johnson case are many glaring factors 
which distinguish the decision from the present action. The 
case did not involve an action for abandonment or forfeiture; 
a warranty deed ha~ transferred full title to the defendants. A 
substantial part of the consideration had been paid by the 
defendants, i.e., three-fourths of the amount necessary to effect 
an unconditionaf purchase under one option phase of the 
agreement. The additional sales price under the option accepted 
by defendant indicated plaintiff assumed the risk of defend-
ant's failure to develop the properties. According to the ex-
pressed language in the contract, little if any room was left 
for interpretation by the court or application of an implied 
covenant to develop the properties. None of the foregoing 
factors are present in the case now before the Court. Moreover, 
in the present action, not only is the Court confronted with an 
agreement and circumstances from which the duty of develop-
ment and operation· fairly leaps as a necessary conclusion, but 
in a~dition, as subsequent portions of this argument will re-
veal, under these facts the universal rule is that an implied 
covenant to develop and operate the properties with reasonable 
diligence is a necessary, equitable, and just interpretation. 
Surely, Chief Justice Straup' s c9nclusion is singularly ap-
plicable to the present case. Here the pl~intiffs have received 
nothing, the defendants have not been damaged by a forfeiture 
of the lease, but if defendant's interpretation is allowed, it is 
likely that the plaintiffs will never receive anything from 
operation of the properties. 
The case of Monfort v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 67 Kans. 310, 
72 Pac. 784, another of appellant's authorities, treated a 
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situation where the lease express! y provided that the lessee 
could retain its rights by paying specified rentals. Again, this 
is no authority for the position taken by the defendant. 
In the case of Meagher v. Uintab Gas Co., 112 Utah 149, 
185 P. 2d 747, judgment was rendered for plaintiff in an action 
to quiet title in an oil and gas lease. On appeal this Court 
reversed the judgment, and in interpreting the agreement con-
cluded that many specific provisions were set forth· requiring 
substantial expenditures and development, and that these pro-
visions were completley fulfilled by the defendant. These 
conditions included such obligations as drilling until the ((Sun-
dance formation" was pierced. The contract involved gave the 
lessee a continuing interest if the lessee completed substantial 
development and expended large sums, all dire~tly related to 
development and operation necessary to comply with the 
specific provisions of the contract. None of these factors is 
present in this case now before the Court, and according! y, the 
language in the dissenting opinion of Justice Wade is particu-
larly appropriate. 
Other authorities cited by appellant will be distinguished 
in subsequent portions of this Brief. We now turn to an analysis 
of the law with respect to implied covenants for development 
and operation of properties under mining leases. 
Accompanying the express provisions in the contracts 
which allow for no other interpretation than the duty of de-
fendant to operate the property with reasonable diligence and 
continuity, as found by the Lower Court, a recognized principle 
establishes an implied condition for operation and develop-
ment when one of the main considerations for the mining 
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lease is the payment of royalties out of operations. As indicated 
in the foregoing, both the Utah State Lease (Exhibit nA") 
and the agreement (Exhibit (CB"), provide for the payment 
of substantial royalties to the State Land Board and to plaintiffs, 
respectively. 
The implied obligation is two-fold: first, to develop; and 
second, to operate. With respect to the implied obligation to 
develop, in 60 A.L.R. 901, the editor states the policy consid-
erations and the rule, as follows: 
teA lease of land for the exploration and development 
of minerals is executed by the lessor in the hope and 
upon the condition, either express or implied, that the 
land will be developed for minerals. Hence, it would be 
unjust and unreasonable, and contravene the nature 
and spirit of the lease, to allow the lessee to continue 
to hold the land for any considerable length of time 
without making a reasonable effort to develop its ac-
cording to the express or implied purpose of the lease, 
even though there is a provision in the contract for the 
payment of a minimum royalty. 
((Hence, where the consideration for the lease of 
land for the mining of minerals therefrom is the agree-
ment by the lessee to pay a royalty on the product 
mined, this stipulation is construed to indicate it to 
be the intention of the parties that the lessee shall 
develop the leased premises for minerals to the mu-
tual profit of himself and the lessor, and from this 
presumed intent there springs the implied obligation 
on the part of the lessee to develop the premises and 
mine the product within a reasonable time." 
Concerning the obligation to operate after appropriate 
development of the properties, in 60 A.L.R. 904, the rule is 
stated as follows: 
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nln the absence of any express covenant upon the 
subject, there is an implied covenant that the lessee 
in a mining lease, if ore is disclosed which may be 
profitably mined, will use ordinary diligence in working 
the mine and securing the product, if the terms of the 
lease disclose that the lessor's share of the product 
mined, or a royalty, is the real consideration for his 
entering into the lease.'' 
In the case of Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Company, 41 
Ariz. 376, 18 P.2d 649, the plaintiffs contended in an action 
to quiet title and cancel a lease of feldspar properties that the 
lease was void for want of mutuality since the sole considera-
tion accruing to the lessor is a promise to _pay a royalty and the 
lessee is given the sole and absolute right to terminate and 
concel the lease without liability. The court looked with favor 
upon this proposition which bea~s consideration in other points 
of the present appeal. The important p?ase of the case is 
plaintiffs' contention that an implied covenant existed obligat-
ing the lessee to ((prosecute the work of mining and shipping 
with reasonable diligence and continuity of effort, and the 
failure or refusal of the lessee to so prosecute such work con-
stitutes a breach of contract and a failure of consideration 
which entitled the lessor to have such lease cancelled and to 
be restored to possession." The court endorsed the contention 
and said: 
t(Again we think plaintiffs have correctly stated the 
general rule of law. While it is true that a large num-
ber, if not the majority of cases upholding this prin-
ciple have arisen where the lease was for oil or gas 
lands, we are nevertheless impressed that the same 
rule in reason should apply to mineral lands of any 
character. When mining operations are leased on a 
royalty basis, the only way in which the lessor can get 
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anything for his property is through the lessee's working 
it. It is obvious that no sane man would execute such 
a lease unless he believed the lessee would at least 
make a reasonable effort to develop the premises, and 
we think that a lease which provides tbe sole or the 
main consideration moving to the lessor is to be a 
royalty from the proceeds of the mine implies a cove-
nant for diligent operation and imposes on the lessee 
the duty of proceeding in that manner, and his failure 
or refusal so to do warrants the lessor in cancelling the 
lease." (Italics added.) 
In paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact entered by the 
Lower Court it is stated, as follows: 
~~The main and basic considerations for plaintiffs 
entering into the said assignment, Exhibit c ~ B' ', was to 
have reasonably prompt development and diligent 
operation of the property to effect a recovery of royal-
ties due plaintiffs under the assignment, and to receive 
the payment of $5 500.00 under the terms of Exhibit 
~~B''. 
Appellant in its argument raises the rather unusual con-
tention that all plaintiff Harold Best expected to receive from 
the operation was the payment of $5,500.00 under the terms 
of the assignment. Certain! y the receipts of the money was of 
great importance to Mr. Best. However, it is inconceivable 
that the fund could be the sole or even a substantial considera-
tion for the agreement. In the first place, according to the 
assignment, Best was not to receive t&e $5,500.00 unless an 
operating mine was located on the property or unless the AEC 
report was satisfactory. Upon the satisfaction of either of 
these condition_s the $5,500.00 would be paid but not until 
then. Hence, when the fund is~ paid, the defendant is virtually 
assured of commercial property with the result that the $5500.00 
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would be of minor importance and the over-riding royalty due 
Mr. Best woudl be of major importance. As stated by the 
Lower Court on pages 146 and 147 of the transcript: 
(( . . . The other significant feature of the contract 
is one to the effect that the assignee promises to com-
mence operations, weather conditions permiting, as soon 
as reasonable. I have listened to the testimony in this 
case and the arguments of counsel and their various 
contentions. It is contended by the defendant that the 
basic reason for the, Mr. Best, one of the plaintiffs, 
entering this contract was to obtain the fifty-five hun-
dred dollars. Well, I will agree that that was one of 
his basic objects was to receive the fifty-five hundred 
dollars. But I think also the other inducement and basic 
object of entering the contract was to have reasonably 
prompt development of the property in order that he 
might, if it were possible, recover the royalties that 
this contract reserved to him, because in a situation now 
according to the plaintiffs' contention, he has no ob-
ligation to do anything more than- keep the lease to the 
State in good standing. Well, that couldn't possibly 
be of any benefit to the plaintiffs unless the property 
is mined. Now I can't write any provisions into this 
contract. The contract is silent upon what will be the 
situation if the survey reveals that the tunnel didn't 
penetrate the easterly boundary of Section 16. And if 
the A.E.C. prospecting didn't reveal the presence of 
ores. But as I listened to this testimony I put this, 
arr~ve at this conclusion from the conduct of the parties 
as revealed by this evidence that if there was no ore 
revealed in the prospecting of the A.E. C. that the de-
fendants would be under no -further obligation in this 
contract." 
On September 9, 1953 plaintiff Harold E. Best wrote a 
letter to defendants' Agent (Exhibit ttA" attached to plaintiff's 
Request for Admission admitted in evidence by stipulation) in 
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which the over-riding royalty is considered of such substantial 
importance that Mr. Best discusses the nhaula~e allowance" 
and other questions with respect to the royalty due. Mr. Best 
indicates that he woud waive the ((haulage allo~ance" which 
would be a minute part of the money to be received under the 
royalty arrangement, if defendant would pay over in cash the 
sum of $2,500.00. 
The over-riding royalty was one of the main and basic 
considerations !or the agreement. 
If the court should abide by defendant's position in this 
matter not only would plaintiffs be deprived of the $5,500.00, 
since the conditions for payment of that amount were not ful-
filled, but in addition plaintiffs would be deprived of their 
royalties under the agreement since defendant contends that 
it has no obligation to develop or operate the properties. Such 
an interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the parties 
contracted with the intention of having the property escheat 
to the State Land Board, a result which plaintiffs would be 
powerless to avoid unless the lease is cancelled. 
Another case illustrating the application of the doctrine 
of implied covenant is Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Clayton 
Coal Company, 110 Colo. 334, 134 P.2d 1062, in which the 
plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title against the defendant-
lessee under a lease for mining and marketing coal. The lower 
court found that the consideration for the lease was the agree-
ment to pay royalties; that it was therefore the duty of defendant 
to prosecute the work with reasonable diligence which de-
fendant failed to do; and that thereby defendant forfeited and 
abandoned the lease. On appeal judgment for plaintiff-lessor 
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was affirmed. The court held that the lease was abandoned 
and forfeited by defendant and stated: 
(( (where a consideration was receiv~d) fo~ the right to 
explore, develop and remove the mmeral 1s a royalty, 
the courts have read into the lease the implied covenant 
to develop and operate with reasonable diligence. (Cit-
ing authorities). This rule applies to minerals in place 
such as coal, as well as to oil and gas." (Citing authori-
ties) 
See also the case of Cotner v. Mundy, 92 Okla. 268, 219 
Pac. 321, involving a sand and gravel lease. 
Other cases cited by appellant lose all of their authority 
when viewed in the light of facts and circumstances then exist-
ing. The case of Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum Com-
pany, supra, cited on page 18 of Appellant's Brief, ac-
tually stands as authority for imposition of the implied 
covenant to develop and operate mining properties with rea-
sonable diligence. The case expressly holds that unless other-
wise provided in the instrument, there is an implied covenant 
by the lessee who is to receive a royalty that the tract will be 
prudent! y developed. The court cites many authorities on page 
99 of the Pacific Reporter to substantiate this rule. In the 
Fischer case, however, the lessee had drilled the property and 
had discovered a producing well. Also, other extensive drilling 
had resulted in dry holes. Another distinguishing factor is 
that the United States and the State of Kansas had adopted 
policies and measures to control and restrict the production 
of oil due to the fact that potential production was greatly 
in excess of market demands. No such factor may be found 
in the present case where national defense and government 
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policies reflect the need for immediate production of uranium 
indicated by a production bonus system. 
Again, the case of Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69, 106 
Pac. 945, cited by appellant on page 20 of its brief, is no 
authority for the propositions which defendan~ attempts to 
.support. The Caine case ~oncerns the sale or transfer of an 
option to purchase, and the case simply holds that the assignee 
should not be bound to pay the purchase price without exer-
cising the option. The case is the furthest thing from an 
analogy to the present action and is not in point. 
Similarly, in the case of Alford v. Dennis. (Kan.) 
170 Pac. 1006, a portion of the land, originally covered by 
one contract of ,lease, had been assigned and the assignee con-
tended that it was implied that a covenant to develop covered 
his portion of the property separate and a part from the property 
as a whole. The court held that the lessee had fulfilled its 
duties under the lease of the original properties and that there 
was no implied covenant to develop that small portion of the 
properties ultimately assigned to plaintiff. The obligations 
to develop had been fulfilled by the drilling of a total of 2 5 
wells on the leased tract. In the light of these factors, the 
case is completely distinguished from the present action. 
The case of Chandler v. Hart, 161 Cal. 445, 119 Pac. 516, 
concerned the lease of land for a term of years with a full 
consideration in the form of stock paid at the time of execution 
of the lease. The court said: 
uw e know of no rule declaring that a demise of land 
for such purposes, upon a full consideration received 
in advance, is forfeited by a failure of the lessee to 
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develop and extract the oil, unless such a right of for-
feiture is reserved in the demise, either expressly or 
by necessary implications from the expressed terms." 
(Italics added) 
The court in the Chandler case reasoned that no implied 
covenant applied since the entire consideration was received 
in advance, no royalties haying been reserved. Situations where 
leases are executed for the purpose of making a discovery of 
oil are carefully distinguished, in which latter event the court 
announced: 
(( ... the estate and right of possession of the lessee 
in the premises ceases if he does not diligently prosecute 
to success the work of discovery and the work of ex-
traction after discovery.'' 
And so many of the cases cited by appellant when properly 
viewed in the light of the circumstances then existing stand as 
authority for the action of the Trial Court in the present case. 
The case of Munson v. A. & H. lnv. Company, 62 Utah 
13, 218 Pac. 109, involved an action for recision of a contract 
for the sale of an interest. in an apartment house. The great 
body of judicial authority. in Utah and elsewhere concerning 
the failure to perform conditions of payment under contracts 
for the purchase of real property under no conceivable cir-
cumstances. may be used as authority for duties imposed under 
a mineral lease when the lessor reserves a royalty interest in 
the leased property. 
In answer to defendant's contention that the Court should 
not have imposed the relief of forfeiture, we invite attention 
to plaintiffs' authorities briefed in the foregoing where a for-
feiture was the natural and immediate result of a breach of 
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conditions to develop and operate the properties with reason-
able diligence. While in some other fields of the law for-
feitures are considered as rather a harsh remedy, in the area 
of mining leases all of the equities favor a forfeiture. The 
rule is stated in 60 A.L.R. 922, as follows: 
uWhile equity generally abhors a forfeiture, and 
will refuse to enforce a provision therefor, yet when 
such a forfeiture works equity and is essential to public 
and private interests in the development of minerals 
in land, the landowner as well as the public will be 
protected from the laches of the lessee, and a forfeiture 
of the lease will be decreed, where such forfeiture does 
not contravene unambiguous stipulations in the lease, 
and is based upon the neglect and failure of the lessee 
to explore the leased land for minerals and take the 
steps necessary to the production of minerals, if there 
, 
are any. 
The many authorities cited in A.L.R., after the foregoing 
rule is announced by the editor, impel the conclusion that 
declaration of a forfeiture is the favored remedy. 
As stated in Conrad v. Morehead, ( 1883) 89 N.C. 31, as 
follows: 
(Cit would be unjust and unreasonable, and contra-
vene the nature and spirit of the lease, to allow the 
lessee to continue to hold his term a considerable length 
of time, without making any effort at all to mine for 
gold or other metals." 
In addition to the necessary conclusion that reason and 
justice support the remedy of forfeiture, II American Law of 
Property 680 recognizes that when there has been no pro-
duction upon the claims then there is no measure of damages 
41 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the remedy at law is inadequate, and the only conceivable 
remedy is termination of the interest. 
Again, appellant makes a glaring attempt to torture 
general rules taken from unrelated fields of the law to sub-
stantiate its contentions. 
The defendant did nothing which could be conceived as 
reasonably calculated to operate and develop the properties. 
The duties imposed by the contract and implied by the law have 
resulted in the necessary and equitable forfeiture of the lease 
and the action of the Trial Court in this regard should not be 
disturbed. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORT A 
FINDING OF LACK OF MUTUALITY IN THE AGREE-
-
MENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT. 
It is admitted that the trial court did not explicitly find 
or conclude that the agreel?ent was unenforceable for reason 
of lack of mutuality. For that reason defendant's argument 
on this point is surplusag~. It is obvious that either abandon-
ment or forfeiture sustains the decision of the trial court. 
If a finding of mutuality be ~eemed implicit and necessary 
to support the Trial Court's judgment, such a finding is sup-
ported by the evidence. The agreement provides as follows: 
nThe assignee at all times has the right to abandon 
said mine and retain all the equipment thereon except 
as forbidden by the said laws of Utah. In the event 
42 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~\~l:~f;j~:,j;~~~·j~' 
of the abandonment of said mine, asstgnee must re-
assign said lease to assignor.'' 
It is also well to note in relation to this clause that the 
defendant drew the agreement (R. 10, R. 121). 
Petroleum Co. v. Coal, Coke and Manufacturing Co., 89 
Tenn. 381, 18 S.W. 65, indicates certain factors which would 
support lack of mutuality in an option case. The lessee had 
option to develop, and mine, and any penalty provision was 
lacking. From these factors the court concluded a lack of 
mutuality existed. See also Taylor v. Kingman Feldspar Com-
pany, supra. 
Defendant through Herman Stern testified as follows in 
answer to the obligation of mining: 
((We have the obligation to mine if it proves profit-
able ... '' 
In other words, defendant, under its own theory of the 
case, has the exclusiv~ option of decision under the agreement. 
It is bound to do nothing insofar as mining the property is 
concerned. Such an agreem_ent as conceived and drafted by the 
defendant is lacking in equitable treatment of the plaintiff 
and in its own necessary legal sufficiency. The plaintiffs were 
rightfully restored to their mining lease by the Trial Court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN COMPLETE HAR-
MONY WITH THE CUSTOM OF COURTS AND THE 
LAW AND PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
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CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF REAL P AR'TY IN 
INTEREST. 
A. Defendant did not ritise the issue of real party in interest 
by affirmative defense and defendant was in no way prejudiced 
by the action of the lower court. 
The introductory paragraph to Point IV of appellant's 
brief is ind~ed nstar~ling" as appellant contends, but startling 
only because of_a completely erroneous statement of the law and 
what transpired at the trial. 
Defendant initially contends that its answer raised the 
issue of plaintiff Harold Best's standing as a real party in 
interest. Such is not the case. Defendant in paragraph 8 of 
its answer alleged no more substance than the plaintiff Harold 
Best had assigned his interest to another person or persons. 
This in no way tenders an issue for trial. 
In the Utah case of Hiramatsu v. Maryland Insurance Co., 
73 Utah 303, 309, 273 Pac. 963, plaintiff commenced an 
action under a policy against his insurance company for dam-
ages to his car: The car was purchased by plaintiff from the 
Service Motor Comp~ny under a title retaining contract which 
was assigned to the Thatcher Brothers Banking Company, and 
defendant alleged in its answer that plaintiff was not the only 
real party in inetrest, but that these two concerns were also real 
parties. 
After judgment in favor of plaintiff and on appeal de-
fendant contended that Thatcher Brothers Bankers and the 
Service Motor Company were ((real parties in interest and not 
bound by the judgment." This Court affirmed the judgment 
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for plaintiff and stated at page 965 that it did not appear on 
the face of the complaint that any one other than plaintiff 
was a real or necessary party and that defendant attempted to 
raise the issue by its answer. The Court said: 
(Cit is merely alleged that they (are real parties in 
interest,' but nothing is, nor are there any facts, al-
leged to show wherein or in what particular either of 
them was a real party in interest when the action was 
commenced. That was essential if the defendant desired 
to enter an issue in such respect/' (Italics added) 
The Court concluded that the question of real party in 
interest ((presents no ruling for review, and thus shows no 
error or prejudice in the premises.'' 
A similar case is found in Arthur S. Hoyt Co., Inc., v. 
Gallagher's Warehouse, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 17a. 42, Case I 
(D.C.E.D. Pa., 195 3) wherein the court stated that the second 
separate defense attempts to raise the question that the plaintiff 
is not the real party in interest, but the statement of it ( (amounts 
to nothing more than a conclusion of law without supporting 
facts." 
In the case of Tinker v. ·Northwest Air Lines, Inc., 16 
F.R. Serv. 17a. 13 ,Case 1, 11 F.R.D. 540 (U.S.D.C., N.p. 
1951), the court considered defendant's argument concerning 
an assignment, the ((sole effect" being ((to constitute a different 
person the owner of the claim against the defendant." De-
fendant's motion for a rehearing was denied and the court 
quoted from Ronsenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F. 2d 406, 407, 
as follows: 
((Since the claim is owned and may be sued on by 
someone, all a defendant may properly ask is such a 
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party plaintiff as will render the judgment final and 
res judicata of the right sued upon." 
Similarly, in the Utah case of Shaw v. Jeppson, 
239 P. 2d 745, plaintiff obtained an injunction against 
the defendant from teaching dancing in competition with the 
plaintiff. On appeal defendant raised the questio~ that plaintiff 
was not the real party in interest; that rather an undomesti-
cated foreign corporation was the real party. This Court held 
that the plaintiff exacted the restrictive covenant ccfor the pur-
pose of protecting her own interests. She is entitled to enforce 
it on her own behalf." This Court held further that even if 
some other person c crna y incidentally derive an indirect benefit 
from plaintiffs enforcement of her own rights," this would 
not preclude plaintiff from enforcement. Justice Crockett, 
speaking for the court, announced: 
CCThe reason the defendant has the right to have a 
cause of action prosecuted in the name of the real party 
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude any 
action on the same demand by another and permit the 
defendant to assert all defenses or counterclaims avail-
able against the real owners of the cause." 
Justice Crockett concludes with a statement which applies 
with equal force to the present action, as follows: 
c (Defendant will suffer no difficulty in this case on 
that score." , 
And so we pose the question: Wherein lies the prejudice 
against this defendant? The claim was prosecuted by the con-
tracting parties of record and the judgment is final and res 
judicata as to all rights involved. Even if we assume, which 
we expressly deny, that plaintiff Harold Best throughout all 
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the contractural negotiations was acting as an agent for an 
undisclosed principal, Best would be liable under the contract, 
hold the power to sue in his own name, the principal would 
be fully bound by the action of his agent, and the ultimate 
disclosure of a heretofore unknown principal could not affect 
4 
the status of the defendant. 3 C.J.S. Agency, Sections 216 
and 244; Montague Manufacturing Co. v. Aycock-Hally Lum-
ber Co., 139 Va. 742, 124 S.E. 208. 
Let us assume further, which again is denied, that plaintiff 
Harold Best assigned his interest under the contract with 
defendant to some unknown third person. Could this affect 
the rights of the defendant? Certainly an assignment will not 
be effective and could not prejudice the rights of a contracting 
party until such assignment is made known. In re Leterman, 
Becher & Co., 260 Fed. 543, 171 C.C.A. 327. It is stated in 
6 C.J.S., Assignments, Sec. 74, as follows: 
nThe notice, however, must be sufficiently direct and 
definite to enable the debtor to know of the assignment; 
it should name or identify the assignee; it must be suf-
ficently definite to enable the debtor to identify the 
subject matter thereof; and it will not be effective 
until actually communicated to the debtor." 
Actually, if plaintiffs could not sue in this case as con-
tracting parties and record title holders, it is difficult to imagine 
anyone who could bring the action against defendant. M. H. 
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 
211 Pac. 998. 
This Court in Child v. Gillis Construction Co., 42 Utah 
120 ,129 Pac. 356, involving the question raised by defendant 
on appeal of plaintiffs' capacity as a real party in interest, 
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appropriately summarized the doctrine involved by a statement 
now of substantial importance to plaintiff in _ this case, as 
follows: 
u • • • there is absolutely nothing shown how the 
fact whether Mr. Child (Plaintiff in the action) was 
principal or agent could in any way affect appellant's 
legal rights, and hence the error, if in fact the court 
committed such by not submitting the question of 
agency to the jury as requested by appellant, is wholly 
harmless. To reverse a case for such a reason under 
sue h circumstances would amount almost to a travesty." 
(Italics added) 
B. Defendant is bound by the pre-trial order which did 
not raise the defense of real party in interest. On file with this 
Honorable Court is a complete transcript of the Pre-Trial 
Hearing held on the 28th day of March, 195 5, wherein various 
aspects of the discovery pleadings are settled (Pre-Trial Tr. 
2-31) , counsel for both sides make a statement to the court 
as to their respective contentions, (Pre-Trial Tr. 32-40) the 
facts established by discovery techniques are reviewed, and 
the Court ultimately entered a Pre-Trial Order based on the 
rather lengthy arguments and discussion. The Pre-Trial Order 
and the stipulation of ·codnsel with respect thereto (Pre-Trial 
T r. 40-4 5 ) is as follows: 
MR. HOLBROOK: nWe will be willing to submit it 
on that basis, Your Honor. We have nothing further 
to present to the court at this time." 
THE COURT: nis that all right \vith you then the 
way I have set it out?" 
MR. ARNOVITZ: ~] think the issues substantially. 
I've had some doubt as to whether the issue of for-
feiture is in the complaint but I assume that Your 
Honor now states that it becomes a part of the issues?, 
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THE COURT: ({Well, of course when I say has there 
been a forfeiture, has there been a breach of such a 
nature that the defendant has lost any right to further 
assert anything, it's assignment. That is the issue. And, 
of course, that involves the question of law whether 
under this contract he is entitled to a reassignment in 
the event of a breach. I can make it a little bit more 
specific. I will restate the issues. Is there such a lack 
of mutuality in the contract, Plaintiff's Exhibit B, that 
the plaintiff is entitled to a reassignment of the lease 
to the school section described in the complaint? 
nHas there been an abandonment of the contract, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit B, on the part of the defendant ? 
ctHas the defendant breached the contract, Plaintiff's 
Exhibit B, and if there has been such a breach is the 
plaintiff entitled to have the school section reassigned? 
t]s the plaintiff entitled to damages, and if so, in 
what amount?" 
MR. ARNOVITZ: tel would also like to have stated, 
if Your Honor please, an issue as counsel has referred 
to it in his affidavit, an issue as to whether there has 
been a waiver of either the breach or the abandon-
ment." 
THE COURT: nAil right. Has there been a waiver 
of the abandonment if any has occurred and a waiver 
of the breach if any has occurred? We will put it that 
way then. And I will try and set the case of trial in 
May. I won't set it for trial before the 15th of May, 
is that agreeable." (Pre-trial Tr. 44-45). 
A binding thread necessary to sustain the dignity of the 
courts and the rights of litigants is the well-recognized rule 
stated in King v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., (D. Ore. 1945) 
68 F. Supp. 1019, 1021, 8 P.R. Serv. 16.32, Case 3, as follows: 
''An admission by counsel in open court made part 
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of the judicial record and used as a foundation for 
judgment, is the most solemn and binding act. * * * 
If courts cannot rely on admissions of counsel made in 
pre-trial conferences, then that procedure has no valid-
ity." 
The Federal Courts in interpreting Rule 16 of the Federal 
Rules of Procedure, which is identical to the Utah Rule, have 
frequently held that limitation of issues at a pre-trial confer-
ence bars consideration of other questions on appeal. Frank v. 
Giesy: 4 F.R. Serv. 16.32, Case 1, 117 F.2d, 122 (C.C.A. 9th, 
1941). 
Nowhere in the pre-trial conference held in the present 
case is there any mention of the defense concerning real party 
in interest and as indicated in foregoing arguments this ques-
tion was not raised by an appropriate pleading. In the case of 
McLouth Steel Corp. v. Mesta Machine Co., I? F. R. Serv. 
17a.44 Case I (D.C.E.D. Pa. 1953), the defendant raised the 
issue that the insurance company and not the defendant was 
the real party in interest. The court held that the right to have 
the real party in interest on record as a plaintiff was a right 
which was waived by the defendant. The court said: 
((In the present case, after two years of procedural 
maneuvering, the defendants presented their motion 
four days before the day on which the case vvas set for 
trial, where all parties had prepared and witnesses 
had been brought from considerable distances. It is 
hard to see how a motion could be less timely." 
Certain! y all the factors of preparation, travel, and loss 
of time apply equally to ~his case. Moreover, t~e question of 
real party in interest was not raised until the tria~ was in prog-
ress, and then after an expressed waiver by failure to plead 
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and include the issue in the pre-trial conference. Either a 
waiver occurred or it was-a tactical maneuver designed to pre-
vent preparation and defense to a question which would have 
no bearing on the case in any event. To reverse such a case on 
these technical grounds would surely be a travesty on justice. 
Appellant in its attempt to establish some technical reason 
for reversal alleges the failure of the Trial Court to enter a 
formal pre-trial order. If it should be concluded that a formal 
order executed by the court is a mandatory requirement, as 
we have pointed out previously, such a failure in no way preju-
diced the defendant. However, the practice of the Federal and 
Utah courts under Rule 16 is not invariably to complete a 
formal document designated as an order. This practice is 
illustrated in Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal fudges, 
1944, 4 F.R.D. 183, 192, where it is stated, as follows: 
teA very usual practice is for the pre-trial judge to 
dictate an order at the close of the conference in the 
presence of counsel with the privilege on their part 
to object to any part of it which does not accord with 
their understanding. * * * In still other jurisdictions 
the transcript of agreements reached and of the issues 
in their streamlined form as developed at the confer-
ence is itself considered as a pre-trial order which 
guides the course of the trial." 
The Lower Court in this case followed this recognized 
practice in every respect. After the issues were settled by stipu-
lation of counsel in the pre-trial conference, the Lower Court 
in the presence of counsel, affording them every opportunity 
to amend and object, dictated the pre-trial order to the re-
porter. Surely such a procedure is in complete harmony with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and with the fundamental 
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basis of interpretation therein set out in Rule 1, that the Rules 
((shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." 
C. The trial court allowed defendant every opportunity 
to present evidence concerning the real party in interest. 
There is no question in this ~ase but what defendant in-
tended to search for something in the trial which was com-
pletely immaterial and irrelevant to the issues, which was 
unsuppor_ted by a sufficient pleading, v.:hich was waived by 
defendant in the pre-trial conference, and which_ could not be 
prejudicial to defendant's case in any event. Notwithstanding, 
defendant was given everr. opportunity by the Lower Court to 
pursue its inquiry in proper form which would not delay, 
handicap and confuse the trial of the case. The Lower Court 
did not, as stated by appellant in its brief, ttsternly refuse to 
permit counsel for defendant even to inquire into the subject." 
On the contrary, the Cou~t indicated to counsel for defendant 
that he may use every discovery technique following the close 
of the trial and that he would be heard on a motion for a new 
trial in the event any factor appeared which would be preju-
dicial to the defendant's case. The Court said: 
~ ~. . . and if at the close of this case I decide it and 
you are dissatisfied with my decision I will let you use 
discovery and I will hear you on any motion for a new 
trial if you make the discovery that there is something 
growing out of this thing that you mentioned of this 
man paying the rentals to the State Land Board." 
(R. 45-46) 
Even in the light of this authorization defendant did not 
see fit to embark upon the inquiry but in the motion for a new 
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trial supported his allegat.ion that plaintiffs were not the real 
parties in interest by a vague affidavit based on hearsay. 
This procedure was certainly a proper exercise of judicial 
discretion and an effective use of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 27 (b) pr<?vides in part t~at tcbefore the taking 
of an appeal if the time therefore has not expired, the district 
court in which the judgme~t was rendered may allow the taking 
of depositions of witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for 
use in the event of further proceedings in such court,'' and 
Rule 59 provides that tcthe court may open the judgment if one 
has been entered, make additional testimony, amend findings 
of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and con-
clusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment." 
The evidence presented by defendant in the motion for 
a new trial was, as indicat~d above, a vague, hearsay affidavit 
merely perpetuating an unwarranted stispicion, which could 
have no substance even if the Lower Court had allowed the 
delay and confusion of a so-called fish~ng expedition at the 
time of trial. A valid exercise of judicial discretion should not 
be disturbed on appeal. 
D. The Trial Court properly allow·ed amendment as to 
parties plaintiff. 
Appellant takes exception to the procedure followed by 
the Lower Court in allowing joinder of Earl Craig as a party 
plaintiff. Appellant alleges_ that the addition of Earl Craig as a 
party plaintiff in the action was without competent evidence 
and based upon the oral representations of counsel. We must 
assume that appellant does not advance the proposition that 
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an attorney is not fJ..Illy competent to represent to a court his 
authority to sue for a party; the contrary to this proposition 
is too firmly established in our judicial system by everyday 
practice to warrant further argument. Appellant- must be con-
tending, therefore, that there was no evidence before the court 
as to Earl Craig's interest it?- the subject matter of the litigation. 
Again appellant conveniently overlooks i~s own evidence in 
this regard. Actually counsel for defendant offered as evidence 
records from the County Recorder's office showing a partial 
assignment of the Utah State Land Board Lease to Earl Craig 
by plaintiff Harold Best (R. 3 7). After representations by 
counsel for plaintiff that he was authorized to represent Earl 
Craig for any interest he may have in the subject matter of 
the litigation (R. 39) and upon plaintiff's motion, Earl Craig 
was joined as a party plaintiff in the lawsuit. This procedure 
is in complete harmony with the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Rule 21, which provides as follows: 
ttMis-joinder of parties is not ground for dismissal 
of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order 
of the court on motion of any party or of its own initia-
tive at any stage of the action and on such terms as 
are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and 
proceeded with separately." 
Action of the court under this rule is a matter of judicial 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear 
abuse is shown. Weaver v. Marcus} ( C.C.A. 4th, 1948) 165 F.2d 
862. The breadth of the lower court's discretion is shown by 
the power to add or drop parties on the court's own initiative. 
Paper Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co.J (D.C. Del. 1947), 
74 F. Supp. 389. 
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In the case of Automatic Dialing Corp. v. Maritime 
Quality Hardware Co., 16 F.R. Serv. 17a.13. Case 2, 98 F. Supp. 
650, arising as a result Qf a breakdown of contractural rela-
tionships, judgment was awarded to defendant on its counter-
claim. In the trial on the merits before the court, ((exhaustive 
testimony was taken, numerous exhibits were filed with the 
court, and extensive briefs have been submitted to the court by 
all parties." 
After judgment plaintiff raised the issue as to the capacity 
of defendant to prosecute its counter-claim in view of the real 
party in interest rule. Plaintiff introduced an assignment from 
defendant to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of all 
monies due or to become due from plaintiff. The court re-
ceived from counsel for the RFC a statement that the agency 
consents to the jurisdiction of the court to be joined as a party 
to the counter-claim in the action. The court held as follows: 
((It is in the interest of justice to all parties that the 
RFC be made a party to the present action, thus meet-
ing the requirements of the Real Party In Interest Rule, 
and concluding the case for all the parties concerned. 
Therefore, by virtue of authority vested in it by Rules 
13 (h) and 21 of The Federal Rules of Procedure, 
this court will order that the RFC be joined as a de-
fendant herein * * * This court considers that the 
consent of the RFC in this regard is a highly commend-
able step, in eliminating the possibility of a rehearing 
of the evidence in this somewhat complex case." 
The hearty endorsement of the court of the procedure 
followed in joining RFC as an additional party after judg-
ment was entered, would, we believe, receive like approval in 
this case if we were able to fulfill defendant's suspicion that 
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someone other than Harold Best and Earl Craig are real parties 
to this litigation. Defendant has nothing to gain by such a 
discovery and plaintiffs have nothing to lose by such a revela-
tion. Defendant has fulfilled its desire that any party whose 
interest has been shown be joined in the action, and to claim 
prejudice as a result is again indicative of defendant's attempt 
to avoid the Lower Court's judgment with misleading and con-
tradictory arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's brief intermittently reflects alleged facts 
adeptly twisted to coincide with random selections of abstract 
general law. 
Plaintiffs have stated facts established by the record and 
have harmoniously joined these facts with authorities, directly 
and conclusively establishing the reason and justice supporting 
the judgment of the Trial Court. As the Trial Court observed 
the evasiye witnesses and drew conclusions as _to veracity and 
import of the testimony,_ so also will the Appellate Court 
analyze the issues and law and distinguish the sound and just 
from the evasive and indecisive. 
Defendant manifested every inten~ion and performed 
every act of abandonment. Conversely, defendant did nothing 
to fulfill its duties of development and operation of the prop-
erties, again indicating an abandonment, and in the alternative, 
resulting in a forfe~ture, and yet defendant asks this Court to 
look with pleasure upon a continuance of the assignment in 
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face of the paradox that it has taken no positi~e action, and 
indeed contends that nothing need be accomplished. 
Defendant is caught in the inconsistent mire of its argu-
ments and is forced into an abortive reliance on real parties in 
interest and alleged error in the proceedings, which are in fact 
non-existent and in no event prejudicial. 
It has been made abundantly clear through the means of 
a careful briefing of defe11:dant' s authorities that its position is 
without any support what~oever. 
Under the state of the record, the findings of the Trial 
Court and the only conceivable remedy should not be disturbed 
on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOLBROOK, BAUCOM & WILKINS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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